Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Massachusetts) has suggested a wealth tax of 2 percent on assets above $50 million, and 3 percent on assets of more than $1 billion. She estimates that such a tax, which would by its nature be limited to the very rich, could generate $2.75 trillion in revenue over a decade. To paraphrase the late Everett Dirksen, a trillion here, a trillion there, and pretty soon you’re talking real money.
Starbucks billionaire Howard Schultz and former NYC mayor billionaire Michael Bloomberg have, of course, slammed Warren’s proposal as a gateway drug to Venezuela-Maduro style socialism. Continued critiques from Schultz, Bloomberg and the billionaire class will probably do more to garner support for Warren’s proposal than she herself could do with a thousand townhall meetings.
Schultz and Bloomberg apparently have forgotten that while they have ascended to levels of wealth that would make Croesus look like a homeless person, hundreds of millions of Americans (and Britons, and Europeans, etc.) have been undeniably left behind by the Great Prosperity of globalization and financialization of the economy. Wealth taxes have been proposed before, though not in the U.S.
Towards the end of the First World War, Great Britain considered imposing a wealth tax. Throughout the war, Great Britain not only had to equip and supply its own forces, it also had to advance funds to its allies France, Russia and Italy since none of them had enough cash to purchase necessary war matériel. By 1917, the cost of the war, including subsidies to allies, had put unprecedented strain on Britain’s national budget.
During the first three years of the war, taxation rates in Great Britain had increased significantly, and the levels of income to which the tax was applied were lowered. In consequence, many segments of the population that had never before paid income taxes were moved onto the tax rolls. This was accompanied by some erosion of civilian support for the war. In Parliament, Labor members argued that the working classes were bearing a disproportionate share of the war’s cost. Coal miners in South Wales even staged a tax strike in 1917. Labor proposed a tax on capital to ease the deficit, but the Tory constituencies opposed additional taxation generally, and a levy on capital in particular.
Ultimately, the British Treasury rejected any capital levy over concerns that it would cause a slump in asset prices because asset holders would try to raise capital by sales of those assets. That would depress capital markets and, most worrisome of all, possibly reduce the United States’ confidence in the soundness of Britain’s economy.
Of course today, despite nearly two decades of continuous foreign wars, the U.S. is not in the position Great Britain occupied in 1917.