Posts Tagged ‘renewable energy’


Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY, 14th Dist.)

There’s a lot to digest in the Green New Deal Resolution introduced by New York Representative Ocasio-Cortez.

First, though, I have to hand it to Rep. Ocasio-Cortez. Being referred to just by your initials is a mark of high achievement in American politics. Exactly what it means can be debated, but there can be no doubt that it implies some degree of general recognition among the public. We had FDR. We had JFK. Then came LBJ. Eisenhower was called Ike, of course, but he never ascended to the heights DDE. That was probably better for him since those initials are uncomfortably close to DDT. Reagan was never RR. These instances could be multiplied.

Rep. Ocasio-Cortez has been in office for just over a month and she’s already earned her initials: AOC. Whether or not you like her or her views, she’s gained recognition, and some popularity, because she’s correctly viewed as putting the demos back in (little “d”) democracy. Democracy is not equivalent to populism, but that’s a discussion for another day.

Back to the Green New Deal. Section (2)(C) of the GND Resolution calls for meeting 100 percent of the power demand of the United States through “clean, renewable and zero-emission sources…” That could portend some problems for AOC’s supporters because “renewable” and “zero-emission” are not the same. As Voltaire said, “if you wish to debate with me, define your terms.”

Exelon views nuclear generation as zero-emission. Is nuclear generation “clean”? If you formerly lived near Three Mile Island, Chernobyl or Fukushima, your answer is probably a resounding “no!” Likewise, as people who live (or used to live) in those three places will tell you, nuclear power is zero-emission…until it isn’t.

That’s not to say that nuclear should not be part of a balanced power generation portfolio, but, as  I’ve discussed in the Sparkspread over the last several years, two major problems in nuclear generation have to be addressed: spent fuel disposition and regulatory capture. Dealing with those two issues will go a long way to clearing various energy-related poisons from the American political bloodstream. Unfortunately, there has been thus far insufficient political will to deal with either of these issues.

A ten-year schedule to move the U.S. to 100% renewable electricity generation is a laudable goal. But it will be far more ambitious than JFK’s end-of-the=decade moonshot goal of 1961.

If you want more renewable generation, you’ll need more transmission lines – new ones. Not everybody likes new transmission lines, especially when they come to close to their homes and farms, or affect the vistas of nature in America.

Renewables are generation resources, and while renewable generation forecasting has improved with improved meteorology, renewables are not dispatch resources. If a coal-fired or natural gas-fired station goes down, or if its access to the transmission grid is lost for some reason, that incident may occur at a moment when sunlight or wind conditions are insufficient to enable a renewable generating station to supply power to the system.

That is not to say that renewable generation should not be developed, or that it’s worse than coal or natural gas or nuclear, or that there should be no ambitious plan to substantially expand renewable generation over the next ten years. But every form of electricity generation, just like every other discrete product of human ingenuity, has its problems. I’m a big believer in making no small plans, but at the same time don’t get too far away from the known facts.


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Coal-fired Power

Coal-fired Power

While the Hillary v. Donald Rumble on Monday night garnered all the media attention, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals heard a far more substantive discussion the following morning. An en banc panel of ten federal appellate judges heard oral argument on the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan.

It was a “hot bench,” with lots of questions from the judges. And while Hillary and The Donald put down their swords after 90 minutes, the oral argument on the CPP went on for more than seven hours.

West Virginia’s Solicitor General opened with an artillery barrage in the putative war on coal. The CPP sets target emission rates for fossil fuel generators such as coal, and prohibits them from operating if they exceed those limits unless they purchase carbon credits from generators whose emissions are below their assigned limits. He argued that the CPP thus forces coal plant owners into an impossible choice: they either subsidize their renewable energy competitors or shut down prematurely. In his view, that would affect not just West Virginia but the nation as a whole. W. Va. and other opponents argued that the Clean Air Act does not allow the EPA to require plant owners to invest in different generation resources.

The question of the scope of the EPA’s authority got a lot of attention. The EPA and other proponents of the plan countered that this type of regulation is already commonplace in the power industry. They argued that the emissions trading contemplated by the CPP would be the least expensive method of pollution control, especially when compared to setting emissions caps for each plant. EPA argued that the Clean Air Act mandates that it devise the best system of reductions for any particular pollution type, and that’s what the CPP does. They pointed to the Supreme Court’s 2007 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, which mandates that the agency act to regulate carbon. And, they continued, the high court’s 2011 ruling in AEP v. Connecticut affirmed the EPA’s regulation of carbon, declaring that because climate change damages were within the EPA’s jurisdiciton, individual states could not sue power companies for climate change harms.

Their opponents argued that other language in AEP casts doubt on the scope of that holding.

Other CPP opponents claimed that because CPP requires major changes to the power grid, that the EPA is infringing on states’ rights because each state is responsible for the reliability of its own electric power system. Numerous shut-downs of coal-fired plants that would follow implementation of the CPP would adversely affect grid reliability.

Once again, it comes down to the Third Branch Default Setting that we’ve seen before in litigation interpreting laws that are both complex and unclear. The almost endless adventures of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals with the Telecommunications Act of 1996, now forgotten like some long-ago war over an equally forgotten issue, comes to mind. Yet the problem is essentially the same. Congress enacts a law, but because of its own inability to agree on what that law should really say, it gets passed with provisions that don’t add up, or are even contradictory. But those problems are down the road, and it’s more important for legislators to get some earned media at the signing ceremony and have some accomplishment to write home to constituents about. Thus it falls the judiciary, sooner or later, to sort things out. C’est la vie, c’est la guerre.

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Artist’s conception of a traditional annual performance review at a French investment bank

Even Willie Mays missed a fly ball every once in a while.

Reuters reports that investment banking firm Lazard Ltd, which advised SolarCity on its $2.6 billion sale to Tesla Motors Inc, made an error in its calculations that discounted the value of Solar City by $400 million.

But the headline is worse than the actual story, so one might question whether there’s some “clickbait” sensationalism involved. There was a miscalculation according to a regulatory filing made by Solar City, but the miscalculation related to a range of minimum-maximum share prices, rather than to a definite acquisition price.

Using its discounted cash flow model, Lazard came up with an equity value range of between $14.75 and $34.00 per share for Solar City. After closing, Lazard realized that it had double-counted some of Solar City’s projected debt. After corrections to the DCF calculations, the valuation range was adjusted to $18.75 to $37.75 per share.

The $400 million figure sounds bad, and of course it is. But the purchase price the parties ultimately agreed to, which was paid in Tesla stock, came out to $25.37 per share. So regardless of the error, the price paid was still within the range originally provided by Lazard.

I’m sure there are lawyers out there who would, if asked, take the case and file against Lazard, but I would not count myself among them. Lazard and Tesla will probably dust themselves off and move on. No harm, no foul.

What’s really interesting about this case is not that an error was made, but rather how Lazard might handle its repercussions internally. Who made the error? Who checked the figures? While I wouldn’t take the suit, I would certainly place money on heads rolling across the office floors at Lazard’s headquarters.

[Attention carpet cleaning companies: send your brochures to Lazard now.]

Lazard, originally a French merchant company that grew into a major investment banking house in the New World via New Orleans, might just keep an old Rasoir National (see artist’s conception, above) in storage somewhere in a New Jersey warehouse for just this type of occasion.

When the Great Recession occurred, the Wall Street chorus was that it was nobody’s fault, they never saw it coming, and nobody could have seen it coming.


The rapidity with which Wall Street bankers transitioned from omniscient Masters of the Universe to a collection of Sargent Schultz clones was the closest mankind has yet come to attaining the speed of light. Despite precipitating the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression and imposing on the U.S. taxpayer bailout costs rivaling those of a world war, no one was held accountable. Wall Street was grateful for Bernie Madoff because his Ponzi scheme story was simpler and took the spotlight off them.

But if you are the unfortunate person at Lazard on the Solar City-Tesla deal who’s tagged with responsibility for this DCF error, whether you’re a first-year analyst or a managing director, you can expect a career ending scene such as that depicted above.

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Redheaded stepchild: Exelon's Byron nuclear plant

Redheaded stepchild: Exelon’s Byron nuclear plant

Listening to Exelon CEO Chris Crane extol the virtues of the free market and claim that his nuclear plant bailout bill is “market-based” is like listening to heavy metal/punk rock music performed by Pat Boone. The inauthenticity and cognitive dissonance are so fundamental as to cause revulsion at the cellular level.

Exelon introduced its bail-out legislation in the Illinois House of Representatives (HB3293) a few weeks ago. When we say Exelon introduced it, we mean exactly that. The notion that any of the bill’s sponsors in the House could understand the legislation, much less write it, is something only employees of Exelon and its public relations firm could say with a straight face.

The fiction that the Exelon bailout bill provides a “market-based” remedy is embarrassingly unconvincing, but, as Illinois’ long history shows, embarrassment is an emotion unknown to either Exelon or Springfield.

The key to HB3293 is Exelon’s Newspeak definition of “low carbon energy resources.” The Exelon lawyers who drafted HB3293 have cleverly sought to superimpose the imagery of the free market on a mechanism engineered to ensure that Exelon will have a monopolistic stranglehold on the sale of LCE credits. Exelon has tailored the term “low carbon energy resources” like a bespoke suit: it includes its own nuclear plants but excludes virtually all other generation that the average ratepayer might reasonably consider “low carbon.”

Exelon modeled HB3293 after the Illinois renewable portfolio standard. The bill amends the Illinois Power Agency Act by establishing a new “low carbon energy (LCE) credit” portfolio standard.

Beginning January 1, 2016 all electric utilities (such as ComEd, which, like the General Assembly, is one of Exelon’s wholly-owned subsidiaries) must purchase sufficient LCE credits to satisfy the LCE credit standard. The trick, of course, is that the bill authorizes electric utilities to recover all costs of purchasing the LCE credits from ratepayers. Thus, ComEd would once again serve as the tube through which Exelon hoovers up cash from ratepayers’ wallets for the benefit of its corporate treasury. (Headline: “Illinois legislation frees Exelon shareholders from fear of dividend cut.”)

Exelon’s definition of “low carbon” generation stipulates that no low carbon generation resource may have a power purchase agreement longer than 5 years. The effect of this unassuming little statutory quirk is to exclude virtually all wind, and much solar energy from the “low carbon” category. It would also exclude solar energy participating in the IPA’s supplemental procurement, which requires purchase contracts of at least five years.

The quantity of LCE credits that each utility must obtain is set at 70% of annual retail electricity sales. Taking 2012 as a sample year, total retail sales of electricity were approximately 143,540,000 megawatt-hours. http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/illinois/ . (This figure would need to be adjusted by subtracting sales by electric cooperatives and municipalities that run their own systems, but it’s a serviceable proxy for our purposes.) This means that if HB3293 had been in effect for 2012, utilities would have had to acquire roughly 100,000,000 megawatt-hours of LCE credits. That’s a lot of LCE credits.

Exelon’s bailout bill then provides that the LCE credits must be procured from generating resources that are consistent with the “Minimum Internal Resource Requirements” (sic) for capacity established by the applicable regional transmission organization. HB3293 does not define this capitalized term, and a search of PJM (including the PJM manual on capacity markets) and MISO websites did not yield any defined term to match it. However, the term is likely another way to exclude wind, solar and perhaps other renewables from the LCE credit market because the concept of a minimum internal generation resource requirement applies in the context of assessing reliability across a given territory based on generation within it. Reliability, in turn, depends on dispatchable resources. Wind and solar are generation resources, not dispatch resources. Thus, if a particular wind or solar generator made it past HB3293’s first trench because it had a PPA with a term less than five years, it would still get caught on the barbed wire of Exelon’s “Minimum Internal Resource Requirements” criterion. Drafting a statute with a term that is both capitalized and in quotation marks without defining it may strike one as odd, but it’s not so by Exelon’s standards. Like Humpty Dumpty, when Exelon uses a term, it means exactly what Exelon wants it to mean, neither more nor less.

The first procurement of LCE credits will be under a five-year contract beginning January 1, 2016 to May 31, 2021. Just like Exelon’s Electric Infrastructure Modernization Act of 2011, the Exelon bailout bill gives the Illinois Commerce Commission a ridiculously short time period to review the LCE credit procurement plan: it must either approve the plan or approve it with modifications by November 1, 2015. The ICC has no power to disapprove the plan. Exelon wants to make sure that no one has a realistic opportunity to derail its bailout by asking annoying questions during pesky public hearings.

Although Exelon’s bailout bill will ensure that it can use ratepayer wallets as its own private ATM, it tries to camouflage this by providing that the LCE credit procurements must be “cost effective,” meaning that the incremental costs to consumers may not exceed certain limits (an annual average net increase in total costs per kilowatt-hour of no more than 2.015% of the amount paid by eligible retail customers for the planning year ending May 31, 2009).

Then, in a true Newspeak flourish, the Exelon bailout bill provides that “to ensure benefit to consumers,” winning LCE suppliers (note the plural noun; let’s pretend along with everyone in Springfield that there might be more than one) must commit to reimburse the cost of LCE credits for each planning year that the “forecasted average revenue” of the LCE resource that produced those LCE credits exceeds a set price per megawatt-hour. Note that this limitation applies only to the specific nuclear plant that generated the LCE credits in question. That means that if Exelon as a whole is doing just fine revenue-wise, but the three redheaded stepchildren (Byron, Clinton and Quad Cities) aren’t, ratepayers would still have to pay into Exelon’s corporate treasury. This is single-issue ratemaking writ large; that is, allowing a utility to single out specific cost or revenue components in order to recover them separately from ratepayers, without regard to the utility’s costs or revenues as a whole.

Yep, the Illinois Commerce Commission will hardly need any time to review Exelon’s procurement plan.

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Exelon CEO Chris Crane

Exelon CEO Chris Crane

Don’t let the yesterday’s Crain’s headline (Rauner wants to seize utility funds for the poor to help balance budget) lead you to believe that the state government is the only one looking to pick ratepayers’ pockets.

There’s a reason that Exelon is running full-page ads in the Chicago Tribune (e.g., 1/28/2015, pg 8) proclaiming all the great things their nuclear plants do for Illinois. If electricity prices continue to fall, expect baseball and apple pie to make their way onto that list. Exelon does make electricity, of course, but what Chris Crane, Exelon’s CEO, hopes to achieve through this public relations blitzkrieg is that you’ll confuse Exelon Generation, owner of the nukes and a private enterprise, with Commonwealth Edison, its affiliate and a regulated public utility.  If he can convince Illinois that Exelon Generation is almost, but not quite, a public utility, then he’ll have a better chance of getting money from ratepayers to plug the alleged hole in the budgets of the Byron, Clinton and Quad Cities nuclear stations.

Mr. Crane’s game becomes easier to understand if you put the shoe on the other foot. If his Byron, Clinton and Quad Cities nuclear plants were going gangbusters on profits, all those profits would be upstreamed to Exelon Corp. and either paid out as dividends, spent on stock buybacks, paid out in rich officers’ salaries and bonuses or put back into the business. Mr. Crane wouldn’t need to run full page ads in the Tribune burnishing Exelon Generation’s reputation as a corporate citizen, nor would he consider Exelon Generation obligated to rebate a penny of those profits to ComEd ratepayers.

In fact, if Byron, Clinton and Quad Cities were making fat profits, that would mean electricity prices would be higher. If ratepayers dared to complain, Mr. Crane could tell them that that’s just the result of a free, competitive market in electricity, and that’s what Illinois signed on for back in 1997 with the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Act (220 ILCS 5/16-101 et seq.). That’s capitalism, and if the public doesn’t like it, then the public be damned.

Exelon executive in easy chair, ca. 2015

Exelon executive in easy chair, ca. 2015

But that’s not how things worked out. Electricity prices are down. When Exelon Generation loses money, in Mr. Crane’s world it’s the responsibility of the ratepayers to make up the difference. And that would include those low-income ratepayers who might otherwise have benefited from the LIHEAP funds Governor Rauner would like to apply to the state’s budget deficit.

Mr. Crane’s first tack was to blame renewable energy, and wind energy in particular, for compelling his nuke plants to take low or even negative prices. That argument didn’t hold water for very long. His next tack was to blame “flawed markets,” which was also unconvincing given that Exelon is the biggest dog in the PJM regional transmission organization, and was the principal architect of the wholesale market about which it was complaining. Mr. Crane’s current ploy is to emphasize nuclear power’s freedom from carbon emissions, and to complain that the electricity market doesn’t appreciate that.

Yes, Exelon is complaining that they’re just not appreciated. Perhaps help other than the monetary kind would be more appropriate:

Unappreciated Exelon Generation executive at right.

Unappreciated Exelon Generation executive at right.

These days Mr. Crane’s lobbyists are oozing all over Springfield, prodigating Exelon’s cash into the pockets of quisling legislators who will enact an Exelon-drafted bill that will ensure a pipeline of dollars from ratepayer wallets to Exelon shareholders. That’s crony capitalism. Or maybe it’s “Craney capitalism.”

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Little solar house on the prairie.

A little solar house on the prairie.

The wind will still come sweeping down the plain in Oklahoma, but it will be less favorable for utility customers with distributed generation such as small wind turbines and rooftop solar. Oklahoma has passed a bill that provides for a utility surcharge on these types of small generation facilities. The bill passed with no debate in the Oklahoma House of Representatives and by a margin of 83-5 in the Oklahoma Senate. It now heads to the governor’s desk for signature.

This is the issue about which I wrote in the current issue of the International Energy Law Review, a copy of which is available on the Links page of my website.

Read the story here:

Oklahoma House passes solar surcharge bill | News OK.

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The City of Lancaster, California, has mandated solar energy facilities for all new homes built in the city. The city’s goal is to be the first “net zero” energy community in the world. Read the article here. 

Lancaster’s Mayor, Rex Parris, said that the city developed a prototype home in cooperation with developer KB Homes and a solar energy company. The city’s goal is not just to eliminate a home’s electric bill, but to serve as a model that other cities can follow or adapt. Lancaster obviously takes sustainability seriously, and even has its own Power Authority.

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Stanford University researchers report that it’s now possible to generate electricity from raw sewage. About the size of a D-cell, their prototype “microbial battery” is attached to two electrodes. The simple circuit is completed — and the battery powered — when those electrodes are dipped into a bottle of plant and animal waste dissolved in water.

via Scientists redefine “clean” energy by generating electricity from sewage – Salon.com.

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In an interesting article on prospective growth in solar energy, Reneweconomy reports a statement by FERC Chairman Wellinghoff that, at its current rate of expansion, solar energy will overtake wind in about ten years, and radically change the relationship between consumers and traditional utilities. Read the article here.

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In 2010, the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO), sought approval from FERC to impose a tariff on its members to finance new high-voltage transmission lines. MISO called the new lines “multi-value projects,” but their main purpose was to interconnect wind farms in remote areas of the Great Plains.

All states but one in the MISO footprint have renewable portfolio standards (RPS), either mandatory or aspirational. An RPS is essentially a goal that a state sets for itself to have a certain percentage of its electricity requirements met by renewable generation. For example, a state with a “25 by 25” RPS aims to have 25% of its electricity requirements met from renewable energy by the year 2025. The key thing to remember about any RPS is that it is never satisfied by electricity generated by a renewable generation facility. That’s because once the electricity enters the grid, the grid can’t tell the difference between an electron set in motion by a windfarm and another one escaping from a smoke-belching coal plant. An electron is an electron, as far as juice on the wires is concerned.

Instead, RPS requirements are met by the renewable energy certificates (RECs) that are associated with the generation of electricity by a renewable facility such as a wind farm, solar energy facility, or the like. RECs are denominated in increments of one megawatt-hour and are intended to reflect the “green” attributes of the wind or solar farm, such its lack of emissions. This is a significant difference that’s often overlooked. The RECs (the green energy part) can be traded separately from the electricity itself (the brown energy part). A consumer who is “using” 100% or or 50% green energy is actually paying an additional cost for RECs beyond the cost of the regular “brown” electricity he or she buys.

Before 2010, MISO allocated the cost of transmission upgrades and expansions to the utilities nearest the proposed transmission line on the theory that those utilities benefited most from the improvements. But that logic doesn’t always hold for transmission upgrades that interconnect remote wind farms on the Great Plains because those facilities generate far more electricity than is needed in the sparsely populated regions in which they’re located. So in 2010 MISO changed its policy and started to allocate the costs of transmission upgrades among all of the utilities drawing power from its grid based on their relative usage. The result was that most of the costs of these upgrades fell on urban areas, where demand is greatest.

FERC approved MISO’s change in allocation, and numerous parties appealed that decision to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals (Illinois v. FERC, 2013). In particular, Michigan, which is at the outer edge of the MISO footprint, objected to the new cost allocation scheme because it claimed the amount that it would have to pay would vastly exceed any benefits Michigan would derive from the distant new transmission projects.

Now that might have been Michigan’s best shot, but they also threw in an argument that Michigan law prohibited Michigan utilities from counting towards satisfaction of the state’ s RPS any renewable energy generated by facilities outside Michigan. In answer to this claim, Judge Posner of the 7th Circuit wrote that this Michigan law

“… trips over an insurmountable constitutional objection. Michigan cannot, without violating the commerce clause of Article I of the [United States] Constitution, discriminate against out-of-state renewable energy.”

Posner’s comment has unsettled one of the foundations on which state legislatures have enacted RPSs, namely, a preference for homegrown renewables and the jobs and related economic benefits that flow from a localized green energy industry. What Posner missed though, is the distinction between the electricity generated by the renewable plants outside the state and the RECs associated with that generation. Either Michigan’s lawyers failed to present this argument correctly, or if they did then Posner didn’t grasp it. The Michigan statute in question has neither applicability, relevance or effect on any electricity going in or out of the state on interstate transmission lines, which are federally regulated. But because Michigan’s lawyers used this argument, they invited appellate court commentary on whether geographic preferences or restrictions (meaning in-state preferences or restrictions for the most part) under state RPSs offend the dormant commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The express commerce clause provides that only Congress can regulate commerce among the states, and the dormant commerce clause is the negative inference that states may not regulate that trade.

Under the dormant commerce clause, state statutes like Michigan’s that are facially discriminatory are subject to “strict scrutiny,” meaning that the statutes must both serve a compelling interest and be the least intrusive means of achieving that interest with regard to interstate commerce. If a statute fails to meet either of these tests, then the statute is per se invalid under the commerce clause.

Posner failed to consider that every state RPS applies only to electricity consumers within that state. The additional charges for RECs under an RPS are passed through and imposed not on interstate commerce, but on the retail purchase of electricity by residents and businesses within that state. To make that a bit clearer, let’s look at a relatively recent commerce clause case.

Nearly 20 years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 US 186 (1994). West Lynn Creamery concerned a Massachusetts scheme to protect and promote that state’s dairy industry by imposing a tax on all milk sold by wholesalers to in-state retailers. About two thirds of the milk sold to retailers in Massachusetts was produced out-of-state, and proceeds of the tax were put into a dairy “equalization fund.” Whenever a state legislature starts using terms like “equalization” or “rationalization,” commerce clause alarm bells should start going off in every lawyer’s head. In-state producers, who were the only beneficiaries of the fund, were entitled to payments based on their proportionate share of milk produced in state. Effectively, the tax was imposed only on out-of-state milk producers. When some out-of-state dealers refused to pay the tax, Massachusetts began proceedings to revoke their licenses to sell milk, and those dealers brought suit for violation of the commerce clause. The court held that the scheme was one designed to preserve local industry by protecting it against the rigors of interstate competition, which is the hallmark of economic protectionism that the commerce clause prohibits.

But unlike West Lynn Creamery, a typical RPS scheme imposes additional costs only on residents of that state, and those additional costs are for RECs, not for the electricity itself. Unlike the plaintiffs in West Lynn Creamery, in the context of an RPS with an in-state geographic preference, no one outside of the state has to pay anything, nor is there any additional cost imposed on the brown energy generated by any out-of-state facility.

Still, because there are only two markets for RECs, namely the mandatory (i.e., RPS compliance) and the voluntary, a geographic in-state preference will have some effect on interstate commerce, and that will be sufficient to trigger a strict scrutiny analysis. Even an indirect effect on interstate commerce may be sufficient to tip the scales against such an RPS under the dormant commerce clause, even if the putative benefits of the law exceed the burden placed on interstate commerce.

Posner’s observation on the commerce clause was not necessary to the 7th Circuit’s decision in Illinois v. FERC, so it can be regarded as dicta (lawyer-speak for judicial fluff), rather than part of the holding in the case. So while the case does not put a complete kibosh (also a legal term of art) on RPSs with in-state geographic preferences, it definitely creates a cloud.

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